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During the last twenty years, unemployment has been steadily increasing in France, 
from 4% over 1970-1979 to more than 10% over 1990-1994. In the same time, the 
average length in unemployment almost doubled. The share of long-term 
unemployment raised from 23% over 1970-1979 to 38% on 1990-1994. Many policy 
measures were applied in order to tackle this problem. One of these policies, existing in 
many OECD countries, is to favor start-ups.
2 
The main start-up policy in France is the ACCRE (Aide aux Chômeurs Créateurs ou 
Repreneurs d’Entreprises). This mechanism grants the formerly unemployed workers a 
start-up subsidy of 4878 euros and a suppression of labor taxes for the first year. The 
effect of this measure is thus to reduce both the fixed cost of firm creation and its 
variable cost during the first year. 
This type of policy measure has been studied in several theoretical works.  From a 
macroeconomic perspective, a firm creation can be considered as a transition on the 
labor market (Fonseca, Lopez-Garcia and Pissarides, 2001): it allows for reducing the 
number of workers looking for a job and to increase the number of vacancies. 
Therefore, a high start-up cost increases unemployment through two channels. On the 
one hand, high start-up costs dissuade potential entrepreneurs to create a business so 
that will join the workers looking for a job; on the other hand, the lower number of firms 
created involves a lower number of vacancies. Therefore, at equilibrium, higher start-up 
costs are associated to a lower employment level. A start-up subsidy will thus modify 
the equilibrium on the labor market toward a higher employment level.
3 
From a microeconomic viewpoint, the obstacles to firm creation originate in the 
imperfections of the credit market. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) consider the situation 
where the amount of initial capital that an entrepreneur can borrow is limited. The 
                                                
2 See the APCE report. 
3 The authors also provide evidence from macroeconomic data in European countries: they find 
that the employment rate is decreasing with the start-up cost, measured by the length of time 
needed to create a firm. More generally, the potential of start-up policies seems promising since 
a recent study by Blanchflower, Oswald and Stutzer (2001) shows that there are much more  4
choice of occupation results from a trade-off between the revenues given by the 
activities available, but here the financial constraints make some start-up projects 
unreachable. A start-up subsidy will be useful because, on the one hand, its makes a 
larger number of projects reachable and, on the other hand, because the most gifted 
(potential) entrepreneurs are the ones that have the strongest incentives to run start-
ups since they have more to earn in this activity than working for somebody else.
4 
This imperfection of the credit market also involves a higher failure rate of the new 
firms (Milne and Robertson, 1996). The reason is that small firms can only count of 
their initial capital and on their sales to maintain their activity. Therefore, one can 
consider than the start-up projects are similar to investment project with different 
average rates of return and risks, with an average return increasing with the risks.
5 An 
entrepreneur with a small initial capital will succeed only if (s)he chooses a project with 
a high rate of return, and this projects are the ones that have the highest failure rate. 
This implies that the failure rate of firms is inversely related to their initial capital for a 
given line of business. The effect of a start-up subsidy is clear: it entices entrepreneurs 
to undertake projects that are less risky than the ones they would undertake without the 
subsidy.  
Globally, start-up subsidies should increase the number of firms created, their expected 
life and the number of vacant jobs. 
Relatively view econometric studies have been dedicated to the importance of the 
financial constraint for start-ups.
6 Bates (1990) studied the survival probabilities of 
American firms and concludes that both the education level of entrepreneurs and their 
initial capital significantly increase their chances of success. On the contrary, Cressy 
                                                                                                                                          
potential entrepreneurs in Europe than most people think. According to this study, 42% of the 
French people would prefer to run their own business while only 9% do. 
4 For an analysis of firm creation under credit market imperfections, see Lucas (1978). 
Jovanovic (1982) has extended this analysis to the case where the entrepreneurs learn their 
abilities by practise. For another approach, based on the differences of risk-aversion between 
individuals, see Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). 
5 In the case of a new firm, the risk typically depends on the activity chosen by the entrepreneur. 
6 The past econometric studies first focussed on the determinants of the decision to create a 
firm. On this topic, see Evans and Jovanovic (1989), Evans and Leighton (1989), Holtz-Eakin, 
Joulfaian and Rosen (1994a,1994b), Lindh and Ohlsson (1996).  5
(1996), on English firms, concludes that there would be no financial constraint on firm 
start-ups. However, the latter study suffers from data limitations.
 7 
Recently, there have been several evaluations of start-up subsidies in Europe. Pfeiffer 
and Reize (2000) study the effect of the subsidies given to the formerly unemployed 
workers in Germany. They conclude that public support would have a negative effect 
on firm survival in the formerly East Germany and they find no effect on employment. 
The latter result, on employment, has however been re-examined by Almus (2001) on 
comparable data. The author finds that, if one considers firms that have survived at 
least 6 years, there is a positive effect of start-up subsidies on employment growth. 
Battistin, Gavosto and Rettore (2001) study the effect of public support to start-up by 
young entrepreneurs in Italy. The authors compare the hazard rates (i.e. the conditional 
probability of failure) of supported and non-supported firms. They find that the hazard 
rate of supported firm is increasing over time while the hazard rate of the non-
supported firms is decreasing. Both hazard rates become similar after 4 years. 
Globally, it is difficult to give a clear-cut conclusion about the effect of start-up subsidies 
in Europe. There are two main obstacles that hamper evaluations. The first obstacle is 
the data constraint. The second obstacle is that the studies do no always account for 
all the funding sources, especially the bank loans. Both problems can be fixed thanks 
to the SINE survey (Système d’Information sur les Nouvelles Entreprises, lit. 
Information System on the New Firms), that has been explicitly made to describe 
precisely the characteristics of the French start-ups. We will consider both the bank 
loans and the subsidies when we evaluate the impact of subsidies. We use a matching 
method that allows to remove the selection biases associated to the allocation of 
subsidies and loans, and to distinguish the effect of the bank loans and of the start-up 
subsidies on the survival of the new firms. 
In a first step, we study the allocation processes of bank loans and subsidies in order to 
better understand the formation of the initial capital of the new firms. In a second step, 
we study the effect of the initial capital and of its structure (loan, subsidy) on the 
survival of the new firms. 
                                                
7 The “survival variable” is defined as the fact that a bank account open at the National 
Westminster Bank during the second semester of 1988 is still in activity at the first semester of 
1992 (p. 1268). The author concludes that: « an appropriate government policy should make 
business start-ups more difficult » (p. 1266).  6
The data are described in section 2 and the formation of the initial capital is studied in 
section 3. Section 4 presents the methodology used for measuring the effect of bank 
loans and subsidies on firms’ survival. The results are discussed in section 5.  7
1 Data 
The data come from the SINE survey, collected by INSEE, about the start-ups made 
during the first semester of 1994.
8 This information source is interesting since it 
provides the same information both about the projects that have been subsidized and 
the ones that have not. It also includes the prior labor market status of the 
entrepreneurs, which allow us to perform separate analysis for the unemployed and the 
employed. The information available includes the entrepreneur qualification, education 
and his (her) social environment. 
From an evaluation perspective the survey includes the initial capital of the new firms 
and whether they had a bank loan or a start-up subsidy. The subsidy includes the 
ACCRE but, in the survey, is not limited to ACCRE.  
The original SINE sample includes data on 30000 entrepreneurs, including both firm 
creations ex nihilo and buy-outs and has a 30% sampling rate. For this study, we 
restrict our attention to the ex nihilo start-ups for which the entrepreneur was active 
(unemployed or employed) at the date of the creation. We have also excluded the 
creation of subsidiaries by other firms. Notice that matching the SINE file with the file 
that provides the current survival status involves no loss of information.
9 There remains 
13504 firms after this operation, the fall been explained fully by the elimination of buy-
outs, subsidiaries and of formerly inactive people.
10 This data allow us to compute the 
survival rate up to 3 years after the creation of the firm. 
The typical firm in this sample is thus the closest empirical counterpart of the 
theoretical models we have presented in the introduction: they are independently 
owned, are likely to face a credit constraint and some of them had a subsidy and/or a 
bank loans while others did not.
11 
                                                
8 This survey is compulsory. For more information on SINE, see Aucouturier and Daniel (1993), 
Aucouturier (1997) and Lamontagne and Thirion (2000). 
9 All firms in France are identified by a national identification number (the SIREN code). It is 
available in all the files we use for this study, so that matching is automatic. 
10 This information is available in the survey. 
11Notice that our « entrepreneurs » also include women (around 25%).  8
What are the main characteristics of the new firms and are there differences between 
the firms created by the formerly employed and unemployed entrepreneurs? 
The average characteristics of the new firms are presented in Table 1. Entrepreneurs 
that have entrepreneurs in their family or in their acquaintance make about 60% of the 
start-ups. For the majority of these firms, the entrepreneurs holds a professional 
degree, are employees or blue collars and have more than one year of experience in 
the line of business where the firm is created. Their main motivations are to be 
independent or a business opportunity. Finally, they more often start their business 
alone, have made no start-up in the past and often work for the local and regional 
markets.  
Overall, firms’ start-ups result from a business culture that complement the professional 
experiences of the entrepreneurs in the same line of business. 
There are also differences between the formerly employed and unemployed 
entrepreneurs. Overall, compared to the formerly unemployed, the formerly employed 
have a higher education, where more often craftsmen and more likely to have created 
a business in the past. They also invest more often in services. 
Two additional differences appear for the long-term unemployed: they are more often 
without any professional experience in the line of business (42% Vs 27% for the short-
term unemployed) and they more often start a business because they cannot find a job 
(35% Vs 18% for the short-term unemployed). 
These differences of characteristics are accompanied by differences of initial capital 
between the employed and the unemployed (Figure 1). The employed are more often 
in both the smallest (less than 1524 Euros) and the largest classes of initial capital 
(more than 38112 Euros). The fact that the unemployed are more often the classes 3 
and 4 can be explained partly by the amount of the ACCRE. If we start from a capital of 
1524 Euros, the ACCRE alone (4878 Euros) allows reaching 6420 Euros, that is the 
third class of initial capital. Therefore, a personal contribution or a loan of 1220 Euros 
would be enough to explain the more important number of firms in the fourth class if 
initial capital. The stronger presence of the employed in the highest class of capital can 
be explained both by higher savings (proxied by the qualification of the entrepreneur) 
and by the acquaintance of the entrepreneur. The latter affirmation deserves however 
to be comforted by the econometric analysis that we will present later.  9
 
Figure 1: Initial capital of the new firms 
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The differences of survival are also important between the entrepreneurs that have a 
different labor market status. After six semesters, 64% of the firms created by long-
term unemployed are still active, while the figures are 72% for the short-term 
unemployed and 79% for the employed (Figure 2). 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics among the entrepreneurs that did not benefit 
from either a subsidy or a bank loan. The differences of initial capital that remain partly 
reflect the differences of savings among the entrepreneurs. To easier the comparison, 
we will restrict our attention to the percentage of entrepreneurs that have an initial 
capital greater than 7600 Euros (classes 1 to 3): 27% of the long-term unemployed are 
in this situation, 35% of short-term unemployed and 38% of the employed. 
  10 
Figure 2: Survival of the new firms 
 












Table 3 shows that the funding sources available to entrepreneurs depend on their past 
status on the labor market. Short-term and long-term unemployed have a similar 
funding profile: in half of the cases, they only have a subsidy; in a fourth of the cases a 
subsidy and a bank loan. The entrepreneurs that have a loan only are rare (5%) and 
public support is granted to the two-thirds of the unemployed. The long-term 
unemployed are however at a little disadvantage, since they are more often without 
either a loan or a subsidy (28%) than the short-term unemployed (20%). The employed 
are likely to benefit from higher savings and do not have the right to the same public 
support than the unemployed. Therefore, the majority of the employed have neither a 
subsidy nor a loan (66%) or a bank loan only (25%). 
These first observations suggest that the formerly employed workers rely more on their 
own money and, sometimes, on a bank loan. On the contrary, the formerly unemployed 
depend more often on public support for the funding of their start-ups. The reason for 
this difference is likely that the savings of the unemployed are lower than the savings of 
the formerly employed workers.  
Globally, public support would partly fill the initial capital gap of the unemployed and 
should therefore be more efficient for them because they are the more likely to be  11 
credit-rationed. This is an additional reason to perform a separate analysis between the 
unemployed and the employed.
12 
2  The determinants of the initial capital 
The variables that we have selected in order to explain the differences of initial capital 
are the ones that influences savings, the attribution of a bank loan or of a subsidy.
13 
We use the ten following variables in order the explain the initial capital of the start-ups: 
1.  The number of associates; 
2.  The qualification of the entrepreneur; 
3.  The length of experience in the same line of business than the start-up; 
4.  The highest education degree obtained by the entrepreneur; 
5.  The existence of entrepreneurs in the family of the entrepreneur or in his or her 
acquaintance; 
6.  The motivation for the start-up; 
7.  The existence of a previous (different) start-up; 
8.  The market scope; 
9.  The line of business; 
10. The location of the business. 
The initial capital is available by interval in the SINE survey. Therefore we estimate an 
ordered logit model. The results are summarized in Table 4.
14 
                                                
12 Another important reason is that they do not benefit from the same policy measures. 
13 The application forms for the subsidies are available on internet. Their references are : Cerfa 
61-2326 for the economic file, 61-237 for the ACCRE application form, 61-2328 for the 
continuation of the social protection and 61-2329 for the exoneration of labor taxes on the first 
year. The economic file allows to know what the public authorities know when they decide to 
grant the subsidy. 
14 The econometric method and the detailed tables are given in appendix 1.  12 
We first find a group of determinants that are common to all entrepreneurs. The highest 
amounts of initial capital are achieved by the firms with several associates that are 
located in capital-intensive lines of business (like Hôtels, Cafés, Restaurant). The other 
determinants refer to the attributes of the entrepreneurs. The workers that were already 
entrepreneurs before the start-up, the executives and the foremen have a higher initial 
capital, either because they can get more funding or because they can bring more 
money of their own. 
In addition to these common determinants there remains three differences between the 
determinants of the initial capital of the employed and the unemployed. First, for the 
unemployed, the level of capital increases with all the education levels, while this is not 
the case for the employed. For the former, only the highest qualifications have a better 
access to capital. This result can be explained by the fact that the unemployed have 
more often access to start-up subsidies (see below). The second difference is about 
the experience in the same line of business: a longer experience gives a higher capital 
for the employed only. Third, the existence of entrepreneurs in the acquaintance has a 
favorable effect on the initial capital for the employed only. 
In order to understand why these differences of determinants show up, we must study 
the determinants of the bank loan and of the subsidies.  
The two binary variables of subsidy and loan allow to decompose the sources of 
funding in four cases: 
1.  Neither subsidy nor loan, the benchmark (denoted 0); 
2.  Subsidy only (denoted A); 
3.  Loan only (denoted B); 
4.  Both subsidy and loan (denoted AB). 
Since there is no natural order between these four modalities, the standard 
representation of this type of qualitative variable is the multinomial logit model (see 
Maddala, 1983).
15  
                                                
15 The econometric method and the detailed estimates are presented in appendix 2.  13 
The results of these additional regressions clearly reveal the origin the differences of 
determinants. For the unemployed, the fact that all qualifications lead to a higher initial 
capital only comes from the subsidy granting process. Indeed, the education levels are 
significant for two modalities only: they increase the probability either to get a subsidy 
only or to get both a subsidy and a loan. Inversely, the education levels do not 
influences the probability to get a loan only. One effect of the subsidies is therefore that 
they contribute to allocate the initial capital in a more uniform manner among the 
different education levels. 
The second difference is about the effect of experience. We find that the positive effect 
for the employed comes from the loan. We also find positive effects of experience on 
the granting of subsidies for the unemployed but are not reflected in the initial capital 
figures. This suggests that despite the most experienced entrepreneurs have more 
often access to a public support; this support would not be enough to fill the gap with 
the employed. One reason could be that the bank loans given to the employed are of a 
higher amount that the fixed subsidy of 4878 Euros given to the unemployed. 
Third, the effect of the acquaintance on initial capital has a clear origin: It only plays for 
employed and increases the probability to get a bank loan. Therefore it is an effect that 
results from a screening by the bank and that could come from collateral requirements. 
Overall, we find several sources for the differences of initial capitals. An entrepreneur 
can lack capital because of the lack of associates, of entrepreneurs in the 
acquaintance or because of a lack of experience in the line of business. The point is 
that these differences of initial capital will strongly influence the survival of the new 
firms, as we will show later.  14 
3  Evaluation of the effect of the initial capital and of the 
funding sources on the survival of the new firms 
3.1  The evaluation problem 
The methodology used in this study starts from the seminal paper of Rubin (1974), first 
developed in medicine for non-experimental data.
16 We want to evaluate the effect of a 
treatment (i.e., the initial funding structure), denoted T, that are applied to individuals 
(i.e., start-ups) with attributes X (i.e., their characteristics), in order to improve on a 
performance y (i.e., the survival function). The treatment can take four values: neither 
subsidy nor loan (denoted 0), subsidy only (denoted A), loan only (denoted B) or both a 
subsidy and a loan (denoted AB). The aim of the method is to determine the “causal 
effect” of the treatment T on the performance y. Here, the performance is the survival 
probability in semesters. Since there are 6 semesters of data available, we can 
distinguish the short-term from the medium-term effects of the treatment. 
The performance associated to the funding profile T=k is denoted  () k yi  and our goal is 
to evaluate the impact of this treatment on the survival of firms. We can compare the 
relative performance of two funding profiles T=s and T=k by using the two following 
quantities: 
–  () () () k T s y k y E c i i s , k = - = : the expected difference, for the firms with a type k funding, 
between the survival rate they have compared to the rate they would have had if 
they had a type s funding. It is the most common evaluation of treatment k 
(compared to treatment s). Notice that a widespread choice for treatment s is the 
absence of any treatment. The effect of subsidies alone may therefore be 
estimated by  () ( ) () A T y A y E c i i , A = - = 0 0 . 
–  () () () s T s y k y E c ~
i i s , k = - = : the effect that the funding k would have had on the firms 
that have received the funding s. This quantity measures the opportunity to change 
the treatment of the “s-firms”. A common choice for s is the absence of treatment  15 
since the issue of extending the subsidies to more start-ups is clearly interesting. 
This second quantity would be:  () ( ) () 0 0 0 = - = T y A y E c ~
i i , A . 
The main problem is that we never observe the performances  () k yi  and  () s yi at the 
same time. Either start-up i benefits from the funding k and we observe  () k yi , or it 
benefits from funding s and we observe  () s yi . The observable performance is thus: 
() å = =
j i j T i j y y 1  
We must therefore find an estimate of the average performance  () () s T k y E i =  for the 
start-ups that got a type s funding, and evaluate the average performance  () () k T s y E i =  
for the start-ups with funding k. This is the problem of the comparison group. For the 
first quantity, we need to find start-ups that had a type s funding but that would have 
behaved like the k-firms if they had the type k funding.  
In order to get the intuition of the method, we shall start from the case of experimental 
data. With such data, the mean difference of performance between the “k-firms” and 
the “s-firms” provides the effect of treatment k over treatment s. The reason why we 
can make this comparison on experimental data is that the allocation of the treatment is 
random so that the characteristics of the “k-firms” and of the “s-firms” have the same 
distribution. The only problem is that subsidies and loans are not allocated as random, 
as the multinomial regression show.
17 Nevertheless, it is possible to reach a proper 
comparison on non-experimental data if we match firms that have the same probability 
to get a given type of funding. The intuition is that if we consider a set of firms that have 
the same probability to have funding k and that, in this group, there are firms that 
indeed got funding k and firms that did not, then this difference can be considered as 
random. A comparison inside the same probability group is therefore relevant to 
evaluation from non-experimental data. 
                                                                                                                                          
16 For a comprehensive introduction, see Rubin (1997); for a presentation of recent 
developments, see Brodaty, Crépon and Fougère (2002). 
17 If the funding were allocated at random, only the intercepts would be significant.  16 
3.2 Estimation 
The performance of funding k over funding s among the firms that had funding k (i.e., 
among the treated) is defined as: 
() () [ ] k T s y k y E c s , k = - =  
In order to evaluate this quantity, we need both  () [ ] k T k y E =  and  () [ ] k T s y E = . 
The first quantity can easily be estimated from the available data, since it is the 
expected performance of funding k for the firms that got it. On the contrary, the second 
quantity is not observable (i.e. directly estimable) because it is the performance these 
k-firms would have had if they had funding k instead of funding s. In order to estimate 
the latter quantity, we need firms that have benefited from funding s but that have 
characteristics as close as possible from the k-firms.  
The variables chosen for the matching are called the attributes (denoted X) and must 
satisfy the following conditional independence assumption: 
() X T s y ^ . 
Under this assumption, we have: 
() [ ] () [ ] s,X T s y E k,X T s y E = = = , 
and we can perform a comparison for each value of X. Integrating over X, we finally get 
an estimate of the expectation. In practice, this would imply a multidimensional 
matching and this method would be cumbersome. Fortunately, a theorem allows for 
simplifying this method to unidimensional matching. Imbens (1999) and Lechner 
(2001) showed that: 
() () {} [ ] ,X s,k T s T Pr T s y X T s y Î = ^ Þ ^   
with  {} [] []
[] [] X k T Pr X s T Pr
X s T Pr
,X s,k T s T Pr
= + =
=
= Î =   17 
The quantity: 
() []
[] [] X k T Pr X s T Pr
X s T Pr




is called the propensity score and is the relevant criterion on which to match firms. 
Notice that this criterion is closely related to discriminant analysis.
18 This implies that 
the comparison of two firms with different treatments but with similar propensity scores 
is relevant. 
In a first step, we estimate the propensity scores of each start-up from the multinomial 
logit model. In a second step, we match the start-ups that have a similar propensity 
score but different treatments. Following Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1998), we 
estimate the missing expectation by a kernel estimator. The expected performance that 
firm i would have had if it had treatment s instead of treatment k is given by: 
() [] k j
I j
j i I i , y k T s y E ˆ
s
Î ´ w = = å
Î
 
with  () () ( ) [ ]
() () () []
k
I j j i
j i
j I j ,
h s , k s s , k s K








where K(x) is the Epanechnikov kernel, h the Silverman window and  k I  the index set 
of start-ups that got the funding k.
19 The expected causal effect is estimated by: 
() () [] () å å
Î Î
Î = - =
k k I i
i
I i




c ˆ 2 1 1 . 
This estimator is asymptotically normal and its variance is obtained by the bootstrap 
with 100 simulations.
20 The estimation of  s , k c ~  is similar. 
                                                
18 See the fourth chapter of Maddala (1983). 
19 It is the Nadaraya-Watson estimator of  () () k T s y E = . For an introduction to these non-
parametric estimation techniques, see Härdle (1990). 
20 For a comprehensive introduction to the bootstrap, see Efron and Tibshirani (1993).  18 
3.3  Choice of the attributes 
What attributes should we take? The ones that influence both the treatment and the 
performance. 
Indeed, if a variable does not affect the allocation of the treatment, it cannot create a 
selection and therefore cannot create a selection bias. Similarly, if a variable does not 
influence the performance, it cannot create a selection bias on this variable even if it 
creates a selection (it is a harmless selection). It is also clear that an attribute may 
never be influenced by the treatment. 
These constraints justify the choice of the attributes that we have made for the 
multinomial logit regressions. The estimation method can be summarized in the 
following way: 
1.  Choice of the attributes. We take the common determinants of the treatment and of 
the performance.  
2.  Estimation of the propensity scores (multinomial logit). 
3. Determination of the common support of the two types of funding we are 
comparing. We take the intersection of the intervals defined by the 1
st and the 99
th 
percentiles. The percentages of firms available for each comparison are always 
high and have been reported in appendix 3. 
4.  Non-parametric estimation of the causal effect on the common support, by the 
kernel method.  
4 Results 
In a first step, we study how the subsidies and the loans influence the allocation of the 
initial capital of the start-ups. In a second step, we examine the effect of the initial 
capital on firm survival.
21 
                                                
21 The direct effect of the sources of funding on the survival of the new firm is also presented.  19 
4.1  The effect of the funding sources on the initial capital 
We have a good reason to distinguish the effects of subsidies from the effects of the 
bank loans. Indeed, while the ACCRE subsidy is the same for all the unemployed 
(4878 Euros), we should not see differences between the short-term and the long-term 
unemployed regarding the effect of subsidies on the initial capital. On the contrary, the 
bank loans are individual so that their effect on the initial capital should have a much 
stronger variance. Table 6 presents the comparison between the effects of subsidies 
and loans on the initial capital. The evaluation is given in the three columns labeled 
0 , k c . 
Overall, the two sources of funding (subsidy, loan) increase the initial capital. On an a 
priori basis, the effect of the unemployed subsidies should be to displace them from the 
first class of capital (less than 1524 Euros) to the third class (3811-7622 Euros) or to 
the fourth class (7622-15245 Euros). It is exactly what we find. The granting of a 
subsidy reduces the number of entrepreneurs in the first class by 15% to 18% and 
increases the number of entrepreneurs in the classes 3 to 5. Therefore, the initial 
capital distribution is shifted to the right. A similar effect is found for the employed, but it 
is less strong, since the shift is from the first capital class to the third one. The reason 
of this difference is likely that the employed do not have access to the same public 
support as the unemployed. Since the employed come on average from qualifications 
that have higher earnings, our result suggests that they get smaller subsidies than the 
unemployed. 
The effect of the bank loans should be different. On the one hand, it is individual while 
the subsidies are the same for everyone; on the other hand, the bank loans are not 
limited to 4878 Euros. Therefore, it is not surprising that the shift that we find is 
stronger for the bank loans than for the subsidies. The attribution of a bank loan 
reduces the number of firms in the two lowest classes (less than 3811 Euros) by 30% 
to 35%, and it increases the number of firms present in the highest classes. However, 
there is a difference of magnitude between the employed and the unemployed: the 
employed see their presence in the highest class (more than 38112 Euros) increase by 
29%, while the figures for the unemployed are between 11% and 12%. Therefore, the 
bank loans seem to compensate the smaller access to subsidies by the employed.  20 
The strongest initial capital reallocation is obtained when the entrepreneur obtains both 
a subsidy and a loan. In this case, the short-term unemployed fully compensate their 
disadvantage with the employed. But this is not the case for the long-term unemployed 
even in this very favorable situation. Since the amount of subsidy is the same from 
everyone, the difference can only come from the loans or from the collateral (that are 
correlated). 
It remains to see whether the extension of subsidies or loans to the entrepreneurs that 
did not have it would increase their initial capital. A priori, we should find exactly the 
comparable results since the entrepreneurs are comparable by definition of the 
matching method. These potential effects are given in the columns  0 , k c ~  and we find the 
expected results: extending the funding structure would shift the distribution of initial 
capital in the same way than among the other firms. 
4.2  The effect of the initial capital on the survival of the new firms 
The reference point of our analysis is the survival of the firms that have the smaller 
amount of capital (less than 1524 Euros). The first result that we find can be applied to 
all the entrepreneurs: the survival function is first decreasing and then increasing with 
the initial capital (Table 7). 
More precisely, the start-ups with the highest initial capitals first exhibit a weaker 
survival during the three first semesters and then, after equating the survival of the 
other firms during the fourth and the fifth semesters, outperforms the other firms on the 
sixth semester. Therefore, the failure of the start-ups with a high capital comes out 
sooner than the failure of the firms with a low capital. The empirical consequence of 
this property is that it is not possible to evaluate correctly the effect that the initial 
capital has on survival when the time span of the data is too short.
22 Therefore our 
discussion will consider the effect of the initial capital after six semesters (columns 
0 , k c ). 
                                                
22 A similar result is found by Almus (2001) on employment. In the case of this paper, a previous 
study concluded that there was no effect of start-up subsidies on employment after one year. 
On similar data, but with a time span of six years, Almus finds that there is a positive effect of 
start-up subsidies on employment.  21 
The long-term unemployed show up a threshold effect. Below 7622 Euros of initial 
capital, no survival difference appears. On the contrary, when the initial capital crosses 
that threshold, the survival rate shifts upward between 7.6% and 25.2% depending on 
the amount of initial capital. The short-term unemployed increase their performance 
sooner, when their initial capital is higher than 1524 Euros. Here as well, the survival 
gain is increasing with the initial capital: from 8.5% to 24.5%. Finally, the employed 
exhibit a similar pattern as the short-term employed, with a gain increasing from 4.5% 
to 17.6%. Overall, the effect of the initial capital after three years is significantly positive 
and it is stronger for the formerly unemployed entrepreneurs than for the ones that 
were employed. 
What would be the effect of an increase of the initial capital on the survival of the new 
firms that had less than 1524 Euros if they have had more (column  0 , k c ~ )? About the 
same. Favoring the access to capital for business start-ups would increase the survival 
rate of the new firms from 20% to 29% after 3 years. 
4.3  The direct effect of the funding sources on the survival: the 
screening effect 
All the effects of the subsidies and of the loan do not pass trough the initial capital and 
this is why this third evaluation is useful. The reason why the initial capital is not an 
exhaustive summary of the firm is that, for instance, the ACCRE (subsidy for the 
unemployed) is subject to a screening process by the local commissions and also 
benefits from complementary measures as the exoneration of labor taxes during the 
first year.
23 Similarly, the banks have their own screening methods. The main interest 
of this section is to compare the relative quality of the screening by the local 
commissions and by the banks (Table 8). 
The effect of subsidies only is important for the unemployed (column  0 , k c ). A survival 
gain appears at the fourth semester and is still present after three years (7%) for the 
long-term unemployed. This effect is especially interesting because a comparison of 
the mean performances did not reveal anything significant. Therefore, in this case, the 
matching method allowed us to remove an important selection bias. The effect of  22 
subsidies only is similar for the short-term unemployed but it begins at the second 
semester and is maintained after (from 4.9% to 6.6%). 
On the contrary, the subsidies alone have no effect on the survival of the start-ups 
made by the employed. This result could come from the fact that the subsidies for the 
employed are not attributed under the same conditions than the subsidies for the 
employed. This difference can therefore originate either in the screening process or in 
the measures that possibly accompany the subsidies. Our results would suggest, at a 
first glance, to adjust the subsidy system of the employed toward the one of the 
unemployed. 
Is the screening of the subsidies efficient (columns  0 , k c ~ )? We answer to this question 
by estimating the effect the subsidies would have had on the entrepreneurs that did not 
have it. No effect is significant for the short-term unemployed, and some effects are 
significant at the 10% level only for the long-term unemployed. Since theses effects are 
lower than the effect on the firms that had a subsidy, we conclude that the screening of 
projects by the local commissions may be efficient. 
The effect of loans only is not significant for the unemployed, except at the 10% level 
for the short-term unemployed with a magnitude that is comparable to the subsidies. At 
a first glance, the screening by the banks would therefore be less efficient. It is not the 
case, however, for the employed since the loan has a positive effect on survival at all 
dates (up to 8.9% after 3 years). Nevertheless, the expected performance among the 
employed that did not have the loan would have been the same as the ones that got it 
(7.9% after 3 years, not significantly different from 8.9%). There are thus two problems 
arising from the screening by the banks: on the one hand, the start-ups by the 
unemployed do not have a better performance and, on the other hand, the start-ups 
that did not get a loan would have had the same performance than the ones that got it. 
This first result on the screening is also supported by the analysis of the firms that had 
both a subsidy and a loan. 
The start-ups that had both a subsidy and a loan benefit both from a better screening, 
from complementary measures and from a higher level of initial capital. These start-ups 
                                                                                                                                          
23 This effect should not play anymore after 3 years.  23 
also have the better performance. The gain after 3 years is 8% for the employed, 
12.7% for the long-term unemployed and 14.6% for the short-term unemployed. 
The extension of this pattern “screening and loan” to the firms that did not got it also 
seems to be interesting since the effect on the non-treated is significant and varies 
between 10% and 12% of additional survival. 
The latter result allows to soften the conclusion on the effect that the initial capital has 
on the survival of the new firms: the projects that have the highest initial capital live 
longer but they are also projects that benefit both from a loan and a subsidy. This 
output undoubtedly comes for a significant part from the screening process. These 
results suggest that only a two-part policy measure, that would combine a screening of 
the projects with a financial support, would be able to increase significantly the live of 
the new firms. 
4.4  Total effects of subsidies and loans 
By correcting for the sampling rate, we have evaluated the aggregate effects of loans 
and subsidies on the number of firms still in activity after three years (Table 9). Overall, 
among the firms created in the first semester of 1994, the subsidies have maintained 
811 firms in activity, the loans 513 and the combination of both subsidies and loans 
936 firms, that give a total performance of 2260 firms. If we allocate the joint effect 
equality between subsidies and loans, the subsidies would have avoided the failure of 
1279 firms and the loans of 981 firms. However, this result comes from the fact that 
subsidies are given to a larger number of recipients than the bank loans. In order to 
see this, we should compute the success rate in percentage of the number of 
recipients. We find that the subsidies have efficiently supported a start-up in 8% of the 
cases, while the bank loans have an effectiveness rate of 10%. The reason we saw is 
that bank loans are on average of a higher amount than the subsidies. Therefore 
subsidies are globally more efficient than loans only because of its larger number of 
recipients.   24 
Conclusion 
This study highlights the importance of the initial capital in the success of start-ups. It 
therefore suggests that there would remain significant imperfections on the credit 
market that would weaken the creation of new firms. A higher initial capital is 
associated to a lower failure rate. However, this effect can only be exhibited after 3 
years of activity. The latter results go in the same direction of previous studies that 
business start-ups policies can only be evaluated when enough years of data are 
available (Almus, 2001). 
In order to examine this issue, we have decomposed our sample in three groups, from 
the projects that are the less financially constrained (formerly employed) to the most 
constrained (long-term unemployed). This decomposition successfully shows 
significant survival differences that are compatible with differences in initial capital. 
We study the survival function of start-ups at different date and we distinguish two 
types of measures likely to be influenced by policy measures. The first one is a 
subsidy, the second one is a bank loan, which rate could be reduced. The non-
parametric analysis of the survival functions clearly shows that the start-up subsidies 
significantly increase the success of the entrepreneurs that were formerly unemployed. 
No effect is found for the start-ups made by the formerly employed workers. 
Overall, these econometric results go in the same direction as the theoretical model of 
Evans and Jovanovic (1989), showing that the most gifted entrepreneurs would also be 
the more capital constrained. Indeed, we find that the survival difference remains 
constant as time passes by, and this suggests that the supported firms would be well 
managed. 
This study also deals with the opportunity to extend public support to start-ups or not. 
The local authorities that give most subsidies play an important screening role. In 
particular, for formerly unemployed people, the bank loan alone has no significant 
effect on the survival of the start-up while the best performance is achieved by the 
projects that have both a loan and a subsidy. The explanation for this result it that the 
projects selected by the local authorities would be of a better quality than the others. It 
is also possible that the project screening by the banks is made more rapidly and less  25 
deeply, so that the projects that have only a loan fail as often as the ones that are not 
supported at all. 
Overall this study shows that there remain significant imperfections in the credit market, 
because the public support is efficient among the most finance-constrained 
entrepreneurs. We can reach two conclusions. First, in the case of the unemployed, the 
subsidies are efficient and it does not seem interesting to replace it by bank loans. 
Second, the screening by the local authorities looks efficient and should be maintained. 
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Table 2: Initial capital and survival function for the firms that have not 
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Table 4: The determinants of the initial capital 
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RQH ++ ++ ++ 
WZRRUPRUH ++ ++ ++ 
4XDOLILFDWLRQUHI:LWKRXW    
&UDIWVPDQ 0 ++ + 
(QWUHSUHQHXU ++ ++ ++ 
([HFXWLYH ++ ++  + 
)RUHPDQ ++ ++  0 
,QWHUPHGLDWHSURIHVVLRQ ++ ++  0 
(PSOR\HH ++ ++  0 
%OXHFROODU ++ ++  0 
([SHULHQFHLQWKHOLQHRIEXVLQHVVUHI1RQH    
)URP\HDUWROHVVWKDQ\HDUV 0 -  - 0 
)URP\HDUVWROHVVWKDQ\HDUV + 0  ++ 
\HDUVDQGPRUH 0 0  ++ 
+LJKHVWGHJUHHUHI1RGHJUHH    
&HUWLILFDWG¶pWXGHVSULPDLUHV 0 + + 
%UHYHWG¶(WXGHVGX3UHPLHU&\FOH ++ ++ ++ 
&HUWLILFDWG¶$SWLWXGHV3URIHVVLRQQHOOHV ++ ++ ++ 
%DFFDODXUpDW3URIHVVLRQQHO ++ ++ ++ 
%DFFDODXUpDW*pQpUDO ++ + ++ 
%UHYHWGH7HFKQLFLHQ6XSpULHXU ++ ++ ++ 
2QHRUWZR\HDUVRIFROOHJHHGXFDWLRQ 0 0 0 
0RUHWKDQWZR\HDUVRIFROOHJHHGXFDWLRQ ++ ++ ++ 
(QWUHSUHQHXUVLQWKHDFTXDLQWDQFHUHI1R    
,QWKHIDPLO\ 0 0  ++ 
$PRQJUHODWLYHV 0 0 0 
0RWLYDWLRQUHI)LQGDMREDJDLQ    
%HLQGHSHQGHQW + ++  ++ 
%XVLQHVVRSSRUWXQLW\ 0 ++  ++ 
1HZLGHDRUH[DPSOHRIVXFFHVV ++ ++ ++ 
3UHYLRXVVWDUWXSUHI1R    
<HV ++ 0 ++ 
0DUNHWVFRSHUHI1DWLRQDO    
/RFDO 0 0 0 
5HJLRQDO - 0 0 
&URVVERUGHUV 0 0 0 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO 0 0 0 
/LQHRIEXVLQHVVUHI+RWHOVHWF    
6HUYLFHVIRUKRXVHKROGV - -  - -  0 
)RRGLQGXVWU\ - -  - -  0 
2WKHULQGXVWULHV - -  - -  0 
&RQVWUXFWLRQ - -  - -  - - 
&RPPHUFH - -  - -  - - 
7UDQVSRUWV - -  - -  - - 
6HUYLFHVIRUILUPV - -  - -  - - 
ORFDWLRQGXPPLHVQRWUHSRUWHG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WKHOHYHO+SRVLWLYHDQGVLJQLILFDQWDWWKHOHYHO -   -QHJDWLYHDQGVLJQLILFDQWDWWKHOHYHO-QHJDWLYHDQG
VLJQLILFDQWDWWKHOHYHO

 /RQJWHUPXQHPSOR\HG 6KRUWWHUPXQHPSOR\HG (PSOR\HG
 6XEVLG\ /RDQ %RWK 6XEVLG\ /RDQ %RWK 6XEVLG\ /RDQ %RWK
1XPEHURIDVVRFLDWHVUHI1RQH               
RQH 0 ++ ++  +  0  ++ ++  ++ ++ 
WZRRUPRUH - -  ++  0  - -  0  0  0  +  0 
4XDOLILFDWLRQUHI:LWKRXW               
&UDIWVPDQ 0 0  0  0 0  0  0 +  0 
(QWUHSUHQHXU 0  + 0  -  -  - 0 0  0 0 
([HFXWLYH ++ 0  ++ ++ 0  ++  0  0  + 
)RUHPDQ ++ +  ++ ++ 0  ++  0  0  + 
,QWHUPHGLDWHSURIHVVLRQ 0 0  0 ++  0 ++ 0 0  0 
(PSOR\HH ++ 0  ++ ++ 0  ++  0  0  0 
%OXHFROODU ++ 0  ++ ++ 0  ++  0  0  0 
([SHULHQFHLQWKHOLQHRIEXVLQHVVUH
1RQH
              
)URP\HDUWROHVVWKDQ\HDUV ++  0 0 0  0 0 +  0 0 
)URP\HDUVWROHVVWKDQ\HDUV ++ 0  0  0 ++ ++  0 ++  0 
\HDUVDQGPRUH ++ 0  ++ ++  ++ ++  0 ++  + 
+LJKHVWGHJUHHUHI1RGHJUHH               
&HUWLILFDWG¶pWXGHVSULPDLUHV 0 0  0 ++  0 ++ 0  ++ 0 
%UHYHWG¶(WXGHVGX3UHPLHU&\FOH 0 0  0 ++  0 ++ 0  ++ + 
&HUWLILFDWG¶$SWLWXGHV3URIHVVLRQQHOOHV ++ +  ++ ++ 0  ++  0 ++ ++ 
%DFFDODXUpDW3URIHVVLRQQHO ++  ++ ++ ++  ++ ++  0 ++ ++ 
%DFFDODXUpDW*pQpUDO 0 0  0 ++  0 ++ 0  ++ 0 
%UHYHWGH7HFKQLFLHQ6XSpULHXU ++  0 ++ 0 0 ++ 0 0  + 
2QHRUWZR\HDUVRIFROOHJHHGXF 0 0  0  0 0  0  0 +  0 
0RUHWKDQWZR\HDUVRIFROOHJHHGXF 0 0  0 ++  0 ++ 0  ++ 0 
(QWUHSUHQHXUVLQWKHDFTXDLQWDQFHUH
1R
              
,QWKHIDPLO\ 0 0  0  0 0  0  0  ++ 0 
$PRQJUHODWLYHV 0  0 0 0  0 0 +  0 0 
0RWLYDWLRQUHI)LQGDMREDJDLQ               
%HLQGHSHQGHQW 0 ++ ++ ++  ++ ++ -  - +  0 
%XVLQHVVRSSRUWXQLW\ 0 0  0 ++  ++  ++ 0 0  0 
1HZLGHDRUH[DPSOHRIVXFFHVV + 0 ++  ++  0 ++  -  -  0  0 
3UHYLRXVVWDUWXSUHI1R               
<HV - -  0  0  - -  0  - -  - -  0  0 
0DUNHWVFRSHUHI1DWLRQDO               
/RFDO + + ++ ++  ++  ++ 0  ++ 0 
5HJLRQDO 0 0  0 ++  0 ++ 0  ++ 0 
&URVVERUGHUV 0 0  0  0 0  0  0 0  0 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO 0 0  0  0 0  0  0 0  + 
/LQHRIEXVLQHVVUHI+RWHOVHWF               
6HUYLFHVIRUKRXVHKROGV - -  - -  - -  +  - -  -  0  - -  - - 
)RRGLQGXVWU\ 0 0  0  0 0  0  0 0  0 
2WKHULQGXVWULHV 0  0  - -  ++  - -  0  0  - -  - - 
&RQVWUXFWLRQ 0  - -  - -  +  - -  - -  0  - -  - - 
&RPPHUFH 0  - -  - -  0  - -  - -  0  - -  - - 
7UDQVSRUWV 0  0  0  0  - -  - -  0  - -  - - 
6HUYLFHVIRUILUPV 0  - -  - -  ++  - -  - -  0  - -  - - 
ORFDWLRQGXPPLHVQRWUHSRUWHG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Table 7: Causal effect of the initial capital on the survival of the new firms 
 
7KLVWDEOHUHSRUWVWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHSHUIRUPDQFHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHFDSLWDOFODVVLQGLFDWHGDQGWKHORZHVWFDSLWDOFODVV.OHVVWKDQ .VFDSLWDOFODVVV. 
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Table 9:  Aggregated effects of subsidies and bank loans 












6XEVLG\RQO\    
%DQNORDQRQO\    
%RWK    
6XPRIDOOHIIHFWV    
1XPEHURIUHFLSLHQWV  
6XEVLG\RQO\    
%DQNORDQRQO\    
%RWK    
7RWDOQXPEHURIUHFLSLHQWV    
5DWLR(IIHFWV5HFLSLHQWV  
6XEVLG\RQO\    
%DQNORDQRQO\    
%RWK    
:HLJKWHGDYHUDJH    
(IIHFWVRIIXQGLQJV  
6XEVLGLHV     
%DQNORDQV    
7RWDO    
1XPEHURIUHFLSLHQWV  
6XEVLGLHV    
%DQNORDQV    
7RWDOQXPEHURIUHFLSLHQWV    
5DWLR(IIHFWV5HFLSLHQWV  
6XEVLGLHV    
%DQNORDQV    





Appendix 1: The determinants of initial capital 
The initial capital is given by interval in the SINE survey. In the original questionnaire the 
amounts were given in French francs so that we have converted them at the official rate (1 
= 6.55957 FRF). For the purpose of estimation, let K* denote the exact value of capital. We 
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were the coefficients  k a denote the known bounds of the intervals. The determinants of the 
initial capital are denoted X and we can write our model as: 
i i i u b X * K + = , 
where  i u  is a logistic disturbance. The probability that the capital K* belongs to the interval 
k is therefore equal to: 
[] [ ] () ( )
[] ()
[] () b X a F a * K Pr P
b X a F a * K Pr P
k , b X a F b X a F b X a u b X a Pr a * K a Pr P
i i i ,
i i i ,
i k i k i k i i k k i k i , k
- - = ³ =
- = < =







where F is the distribution function of the logistic distribution,  () ( ) ) u exp( / u F - + = 1 1 . The log-
likelihood of the model is equal to: 










P ln b ; X K
i 1
1 1








1 k Ki  
The estimation of this model is made by maximum likelihood, using the logistic procedure of 
SAS.  37
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&RQVWUXFWLRQ -1.84 (0.15)  -1.43 (0.13)  -1.34 (0.11) 
&RPPHUFH -1.37 (0.14)  -1.08 (0.13)  -1.01 (0.10) 
7UDQVSRUWV -0.62 (0.18)  -0.59 (0.15)  -0.65 (0.13) 
6HUYLFHVIRUILUPV -2.05 (0.16)  -1.72 (0.14)  -1.34 (0.11) 
ORFDWLRQGXPPLHVQRWUHSRUWHG     
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Appendix 2: Determinants of the funding sources 
The binary variables of subsidy and bank loan define a funding structure than can take four 
values: 
1.  Neither subsidy nor loan, that is the situation of reference (denoted 0); 
2.  Subsidy only (denoted A); 
3.  Bank loan only  (denoted B); 
4.  Subsidy and bank loan (denoted AB). 
The standard representation of this type of variable is the multinomial logit mode (see 
Maddala, 1983; Gouriéroux, 2000). In this model, we consider that the funding sources that 
the entrepreneur i gets results from a drawing into a multinomial distribution with 
probabilities () ABi Bi Ai i p , p , p , p0 . These probabilities depend on the explanative variables of 
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The log-likelihood of our sample if therefore equal to: 
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The maximum of this likelihood is obtained from a Newton-Raphson algorithm. The 
estimation has been made with SAS-IML through an improved version of the %multino 
macro-command (see Duguet, 1999). The asymptotic standard errors are evaluated from 
the second order derivatives. 
The results are presented in the Tables A.2 to A.4, they summarize the screening 
processes associated to the attribution of subsidies and of the bank loans. They also allow 
to estimate the probability to get each type of funding for all the firms. The situation of 
reference is with neither a subsidy nor a loan. 
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Table A.2: Funding sources of the long-term unemployed 
 
6DPSOHRIHQWUHSUHQHXUVWKDWZHUHORQJWHUPXQHPSOR\HGEHIRUHWKH\VWDUWHGWKHLUEXVLQHVV0D[LPXP
OLNHOLKRRG HVWLPDWHV RI WKH PXOWLQRPLDO ORJLW PRGHO 7KH DV\PSWRWLF VWDQGDUG HUURUV DUH JLYHQ EHWZHHQ
SDUHQWKHVHV7KHVLWXDWLRQRIUHIHUHQFHLV³ZLWKQHLWKHUDVXEVLG\QRUDORDQ´
 
Funding sources:  Subsidy only  Bank loan only  Both 
,QWHUFHSW -2.86 (0.37)  -4.46 (0.98)  -4.41 (0.58) 
1XPEHURIDVVRFLDWHVUHI1RQH     
RQH 0.08 (0.13)  0.73 (0.31)  0.41 (0.15) 
WZRRUPRUH -0.83 (0.27)  1.16 (0.53)  -0.06 (0.30) 
4XDOLILFDWLRQUHI:LWKRXW     
&UDIWVPDQ -0.20 (0.34)  0.82 (0.76)  0.08 (0.43) 
(QWUHSUHQHXU -0.20 (0.50)  1.63 (0.87)  0.57 (0.54) 
([HFXWLYH 0.75 (0.21)  0.85 (0.63)  0.93 (0.27) 
)RUHPDQ 1.08 (0.29)  1.33 (0.78)  1.24 (0.34) 
,QWHUPHGLDWHSURIHVVLRQ 0.27 (0.24)  0.71 (0.79)  0.21 (0.31) 
(PSOR\HH 0.67 (0.17)  0.35 (0.57)  0.66 (0.22) 
%OXHFROODU 0.87 (0.19)  0.78 (0.58)  0.78 (0.24) 
([SHULHQFHLQWKHOLQHRIEXVLQHVVUHI1RQH     
)URP\HDUWROHVVWKDQ\HDUV 0.35 (0.15)  0.12 (0.40)  0.32 (0.19) 
)URP\HDUVWROHVVWKDQ\HDUV 0.30 (0.14)  0.01 (0.35)  0.36 (0.17) 
\HDUVDQGPRUH 0.36 (0.14)  -0.21 (0.38)  0.62 (0.18) 
+LJKHVWGHJUHHUHI1RGHJUHH     
&HUWLILFDWG¶pWXGHVSULPDLUHV 0.18 (0.21)  0.82 (0.64)  0.12 (0.26) 
%UHYHWG¶(WXGHVGX3UHPLHU&\FOH 0.31 (0.21)  0.07 (0.75)  0.30 (0.27) 
&HUWLILFDWG¶$SWLWXGHV3URIHVVLRQQHOOHV 0.69 (0.16)  1.02 (0.56)  0.82 (0.20) 
%DFFDODXUpDW3URIHVVLRQQHO 0.84 (0.22)  1.32 (0.66)  0.65 (0.27) 
%DFFDODXUpDW*pQpUDO 0.20 (0.24)  0.86 (0.72)  0.41 (0.30) 
%UHYHWGH7HFKQLFLHQ6XSpULHXU 0.55 (0.24)  0.67 (0.70)  0.75 (0.30) 
2QHRUWZR\HDUVRIFROOHJHHGXFDWLRQ 0.50 (0.34)  0.73 (0.99)  0.34 (0.43) 
0RUHWKDQWZR\HDUVRIFROOHJHHGXFDWLRQ 0.22 (0.25)  0.60 (0.76)  0.23 (0.32) 
(QWUHSUHQHXUVLQWKHDFTXDLQWDQFHUHI1R     
,QWKHIDPLO\ 0.06 (0.11)  0.20 (0.33)  0.07 (0.14) 
$PRQJUHODWLYHV 0.24 (0.14)  0.28 (0.36)  0.06 (0.17) 
0RWLYDWLRQUHI)LQGDMREDJDLQ     
%HLQGHSHQGHQW 0.20 (0.12)  0.60 (0.30)  0.49 (0.14) 
%XVLQHVVRSSRUWXQLW\ 0.15 (0.17)  -0.30 (0.52)  0.03 (0.22) 
1HZLGHDRUH[DPSOHRIVXFFHVV 0.31 (0.17)  -0.72 (0.65)  0.54 (0.20) 
3UHYLRXVVWDUWXSUHI1R     
<HV -0.41 (0.16)  -0.09 (0.37)  -0.20 (0.20) 
0DUNHWVFRSHUHI1DWLRQDO     
/RFDO 0.35 (0.17)  0.83 (0.49)  1.08 (0.23) 
5HJLRQDO 0.08 (0.16)  0.49 (0.46)  0.33 (0.23) 
&URVVERUGHUV 0.35 (0.71)  0.90 (1.19)  -1.01 (1.28) 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO -0.27 (0.27)  -0.59 (0.79)  -0.06 (0.34) 
/LQHRIEXVLQHVVUHI+RWHOV&DIpV     
6HUYLFHVIRUKRXVHKROGV -0.63 (0.25)  -0.97 (0.52)  -1.20 (0.26) 
)RRGLQGXVWU\ 0.20 (0.46)  0.52 (0.69)  0.01 (0.48) 
2WKHULQGXVWULHV 0.24 (0.25)  -0.70 (0.53)  -0.64 (0.28) 
&RQVWUXFWLRQ -0.12 (0.23)  -1.95 (0.62)  -1.45 (0.27) 
&RPPHUFH -0.04 (0.22)  -1.31 (0.47)  -1.16 (0.25) 
7UDQVSRUWV -0.34 (0.28)  0.23 (0.53)  -0.27 (0.30) 
6HUYLFHVIRUILUPV -0.37 (0.24)  -1.75 (0.63)  -1.81 (0.29) 
ORFDWLRQGXPPLHVQRWUHSRUWHG     
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Table A.3: Funding sources of the short-term unemployed 
 
6DPSOHRIHQWUHSUHQHXUVWKDWZHUHVKRUWWHUPXQHPSOR\HGEHIRUHWKH\VWDUWHGWKHLUEXVLQHVV0D[LPXP
OLNHOLKRRG HVWLPDWHV RI WKH PXOWLQRPLDO ORJLW PRGHO 7KH DV\PSWRWLF VWDQGDUG HUURUV DUH JLYHQ EHWZHHQ
SDUHQWKHVHV7KHVLWXDWLRQRIUHIHUHQFHLV³ZLWKQHLWKHUDVXEVLG\QRUDORDQ´
 
Funding source:  Subsidy only  Bank loan only  Both 
,QWHUFHSW -3.82 (0.38)  -2.20 (0.54)  -5.36 (0.55) 
1XPEHURIDVVRFLDWHVUHI1RQH     
RQH 0.21 (0.11)  0.32 (0.20)  0.55 (0.12) 
WZRRUPRUH -0.42 (0.16)  0.24 (0.28)  -0.19 (0.19) 
4XDOLILFDWLRQUHI:LWKRXW     
&UDIWVPDQ -0.35 (0.28)  -0.20 (0.41)  0.02 (0.35) 
(QWUHSUHQHXU -0.82 (0.34)  -1.32 (0.70)  -0.72 (0.48) 
([HFXWLYH 1.18 (0.20)  -0.14 (0.34)  1.34 (0.25) 
)RUHPDQ 1.34 (0.24)  -0.30 (0.43)  1.57 (0.29) 
,QWHUPHGLDWHSURIHVVLRQ 1.53 (0.25)  0.07 (0.43)  1.51 (0.30) 
(PSOR\HH 1.25 (0.17)  -0.40 (0.27)  1.32 (0.22) 
%OXHFROODU 1.16 (0.18)  -0.03 (0.29)  1.22 (0.23) 
([SHULHQFHLQWKHOLQHRIEXVLQHVVUHI1RQH     
)URP\HDUWROHVVWKDQ\HDUV 0.12 (0.13)  0.27 (0.25)  -0.03 (0.15) 
)URP\HDUVWROHVVWKDQ\HDUV 0.33 (0.12)  0.68 (0.22)  0.44 (0.13) 
\HDUVDQGPRUH 0.37 (0.13)  0.52 (0.24)  0.76 (0.14) 
+LJKHVWGHJUHHUHI1RGHJUHH     
&HUWLILFDWG¶pWXGHVSULPDLUHV 0.42 (0.19)  0.09 (0.37)  0.94 (0.22) 
%UHYHWG¶(WXGHVGX3UHPLHU&\FOH 0.47 (0.19)  0.46 (0.33)  0.79 (0.22) 
&HUWLILFDWG¶$SWLWXGHV3URIHVVLRQQHOOHV 0.58 (0.13)  0.18 (0.26)  0.95 (0.16) 
%DFFDODXUpDW3URIHVVLRQQHO 0.77 (0.18)  0.66 (0.33)  1.11 (0.21) 
%DFFDODXUpDW*pQpUDO 0.49 (0.22)  0.33 (0.42)  0.74 (0.26) 
%UHYHWGH7HFKQLFLHQ6XSpULHXU 0.21 (0.19)  0.44 (0.35)  0.50 (0.23) 
2QHRUWZR\HDUVRIFROOHJHHGXFDWLRQ 0.05 (0.28)  0.19 (0.51)  0.11 (0.35) 
0RUHWKDQWZR\HDUVRIFROOHJHHGXFDWLRQ 0.52 (0.21)  0.02 (0.41)  0.71 (0.26) 
(QWUHSUHQHXUVLQWKHDFTXDLQWDQFHUHI1R     
,QWKHIDPLO\ 0.02 (0.10)  0.21 (0.18)  0.18 (0.11) 
$PRQJUHODWLYHV 0.17 (0.11)  0.01 (0.22)  0.10 (0.13) 
0RWLYDWLRQUHI)LQGDMREDJDLQ     
%HLQGHSHQGHQW 0.36 (0.11)  0.76 (0.24)  0.68 (0.13) 
%XVLQHVVRSSRUWXQLW\ 0.30 (0.14)  0.77 (0.29)  0.62 (0.16) 
1HZLGHDRUH[DPSOHRIVXFFHVV 0.42 (0.16)  0.45 (0.32)  0.65 (0.19) 
3UHYLRXVVWDUWXSUHI1R     
<HV -0.42 (0.14)  -0.03 (0.25)  -0.75 (0.17) 
0DUNHWVFRSHUHI1DWLRQDO     
/RFDO 0.66 (0.14)  0.61 (0.28)  0.90 (0.16) 
5HJLRQDO 0.44 (0.13)  0.30 (0.27)  0.55 (0.16) 
&URVVERUGHUV -0.46 (0.36)  0.60 (0.54)  0.35 (0.36) 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO 0.11 (0.25)  -0.07 (0.47)  -0.16 (0.30) 
/LQHRIEXVLQHVVUHI+RWHOV&DIpV     
6HUYLFHVIRUKRXVHKROGV 0.40 (0.23)  -1.03 (0.33)  -0.44 (0.24) 
)RRGLQGXVWU\ 0.54 (0.36)  -0.56 (0.51)  0.04 (0.36) 
2WKHULQGXVWULHV 0.77 (0.22)  -1.12 (0.33)  -0.06 (0.23) 
&RQVWUXFWLRQ 0.41 (0.21)  -1.60 (0.33)  -0.75 (0.22) 
&RPPHUFH 0.29 (0.21)  -1.25 (0.30)  -0.65 (0.21) 
7UDQVSRUWV -0.10 (0.24)  -0.99 (0.34)  -0.65 (0.24) 
6HUYLFHVIRUILUPV 0.47 (0.22)  -2.05 (0.39)  -1.26 (0.24) 
ORFDWLRQGXPPLHVQRWUHSRUWHG     
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Funding source:  Subsidy only  Bank loan only  Both 
,QWHUFHSW -4.22 (0.79)  -2.94 (0.37)  -6.35 (1.51) 
1XPEHURIDVVRFLDWHVUHI1RQH    
RQH 0.37 (0.15)  0.60 (0.07)  0.63 (0.18) 
WZRRUPRUH 0.12 (0.23)  0.21 (0.11)  -0.01 (0.28) 
4XDOLILFDWLRQUHI:LWKRXW    
&UDIWVPDQ -0.62 (0.54)  0.49 (0.26)  1.75 (1.14) 
(QWUHSUHQHXU -0.08 (0.56)  0.30 (0.28)  1.40 (1.16) 
([HFXWLYH 0.45 (0.52)  0.21 (0.26)  2.10 (1.13) 
)RUHPDQ 0.84 (0.55)  0.45 (0.30)  1.92 (1.14) 
,QWHUPHGLDWHSURIHVVLRQ -0.43 (0.58)  0.14 (0.27)  1.35 (1.15) 
(PSOR\HH 0.07 (0.50)  0.32 (0.26)  1.51 (1.11) 
%OXHFROODU 0.20 (0.51)  0.43 (0.27)  1.71 (1.12) 
([SHULHQFHLQWKHOLQHRIEXVLQHVVUHI1RQH    
)URP\HDUWROHVVWKDQ\HDUV 0.37 (0.22)  0.13 (0.11)  0.12 (0.28) 
)URP\HDUVWROHVVWKDQ\HDUV 0.13 (0.20)  0.38 (0.09)  0.02 (0.23) 
\HDUVDQGPRUH 0.21 (0.19)  0.36 (0.09)  0.40 (0.21) 
+LJKHVWGHJUHHUHI1RGHJUHH    
&HUWLILFDWG¶pWXGHVSULPDLUHV -0.11 (0.33)  0.33 (0.16)  0.40 (0.43) 
%UHYHWG¶(WXGHVGX3UHPLHU&\FOH 0.15 (0.32)  0.41 (0.16)  0.77 (0.40) 
&HUWLILFDWG¶$SWLWXGHV3URIHVVLRQQHOOHV 0.21 (0.24)  0.67 (0.12)  0.87 (0.32) 
%DFFDODXUpDW3URIHVVLRQQHO 0.23 (0.30)  0.56 (0.15)  0.91 (0.39) 
%DFFDODXUpDW*pQpUDO -0.51 (0.42)  0.39 (0.17)  0.74 (0.45) 
%UHYHWGH7HFKQLFLHQ6XSpULHXU 0.10 (0.30)  0.25 (0.16)  0.74 (0.41) 
2QHRUWZR\HDUVRIFROOHJHHGXFDWLRQ -0.61 (0.45)  0.33 (0.19)  -0.44 (0.74) 
0RUHWKDQWZR\HDUVRIFROOHJHHGXFDWLRQ -0.32 (0.31)  0.56 (0.14)  0.32 (0.43) 
(QWUHSUHQHXUVLQWKHDFTXDLQWDQFHUHI1R    
,QWKHIDPLO\ 0.22 (0.16)  0.19 (0.07)  -0.24 (0.18) 
$PRQJUHODWLYHV 0.28 (0.17)  -0.03 (0.09)  -0.06 (0.21) 
0RWLYDWLRQUHI)LQGDMREDJDLQ    
%HLQGHSHQGHQW -0.66 (0.26)  0.31 (0.17)  0.77 (0.53) 
%XVLQHVVRSSRUWXQLW\ -0.38 (0.28)  0.09 (0.18)  0.52 (0.56) 
1HZLGHDRUH[DPSOHRIVXFFHVV -0.98 (0.31)  0.02 (0.18)  0.76 (0.56) 
3UHYLRXVVWDUWXSUHI1R    
<HV -0.67 (0.21)  -0.11 (0.09)  -0.53 (0.24) 
0DUNHWVFRSHUHI1DWLRQDO    
/RFDO 0.13 (0.22)  0.60 (0.11)  0.18 (0.28) 
5HJLRQDO 0.08 (0.22)  0.32 (0.11)  0.17 (0.27) 
&URVVERUGHUV 0.04 (0.61)  -0.01 (0.32)  -0.38 (0.83) 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO -0.21 (0.40)  -0.14 (0.18)  0.61 (0.36) 
/LQHRIEXVLQHVVUHI+RWHOV&DIpV    
6HUYLFHVIRUKRXVHKROGV -0.45 (0.40)  -0.90 (0.14)  -2.26 (0.36) 
)RRGLQGXVWU\ 0.13 (0.62)  -0.07 (0.23)  -0.29 (0.44) 
2WKHULQGXVWULHV 0.08 (0.39)  -0.83 (0.15)  -1.04 (0.28) 
&RQVWUXFWLRQ 0.26 (0.38)  -1.17 (0.15)  -0.87 (0.33) 
&RPPHUFH -0.20 (0.37)  -0.93 (0.14)  -2.21 (0.30) 
7UDQVSRUWV -0.04 (0.44)  -0.34 (0.17)  -0.97 (0.36) 
6HUYLFHVIRUILUPV -0.13 (0.39)  -1.23 (0.15)  -2.73 (0.38) 
ORFDWLRQGXPPLHVQRWUHSRUWHG    
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Appendix 3: Common supports used for the matching 
 
The matching are made on the common support of the propensity score defined 
by [] [] [] () s T Pr k T Pr k T Pr = + = = , for a comparison of treatments k and s. The estimation of the 
probabilities is given in the appendices 1 and 2. We define the common support by the 1
st 
and the 99
th percentiles of the propensity score distribution. The first figure in the table 
indicates the number of firms that are available for the comparison before to take the 
common support. The second figure indicate the percentage of theses firms that are in the 
common support and therefore that have been used to compute the kernel estimators. 
 
Table A.5: Number of firms available for the matching 
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Table A.6: Number of firms available for the matching 
on the funding sources 
 





6XEVLG\RQO\ 1HLWKHUVXEVLG\   
 1RUEDQNORDQ   
 %DQN/RDQRQO\   
 %RWK   
%DQNORDQ 1HLWKHUVXEVLG\   
2QO\ 1RUEDQNORDQ   
 %RWK   
%RWK 1HLWKHUVXEVLG\   
 1RUEDQNORDQ  
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Appendix 4: Causal effects of subsidies and loans 
on the initial capital 
 




k T = ￿ s T =  y  () () () () s T s y E k T k y E = - =   () () () k T s y k y E = -   () () () s T s y k y E = -  
6XEVLG\ 1HLWKHU . -0.178 (0.020)  -0.180 (0.025)  -0.183 (0.021) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ . 0.021 (0.018)  0.025 (0.023)  0.021 (0.020) 
 QRUEDQN . 0.047 (0.019)  0.016 (0.023)  0.027 (0.023) 
 ORDQ . 0.085 (0.018)  0.096 (0.022)  0.087 (0.022) 
 . 0.034 (0.012)  0.043 (0.013)  0.055 (0.019) 
 . 0.008 (0.008)  0.001 (0.007)  -0.008 (0.010) 
      
 /RDQRQO\ . 0.085 (0.024)  0.090 (0.013)  0.112 (0.013) 
 . 0.095 (0.033)  0.120 (0.019)  0.139 (0.016) 
 . 0.102 (0.036)  0.027 (0.025)  0.034 (0.026) 
 . 0.053 (0.039)  0.004 (0.024)  -0.033 (0.026) 
 . -0.100 (0.038)  -0.120 (0.021)  -0.148 (0.022) 
 . -0.235 (0.041)  -0.122 (0.017)  -0.103 (0.017) 
      
 %RWK . 0.111 (0.012)  0.053 (0.032)  0.086 (0.029) 
 . 0.131 (0.016)  0.059 (0.042)  0.046 (0.056) 
 . 0.049 (0.021)  0.051 (0.043)  0.065 (0.053) 
 . 0.001 (0.022)  0.102 (0.040)  0.056 (0.058) 
 . -0.162 (0.020)  -0.043 (0.050)  -0.107 (0.053) 
 . -0.129 (0.016)  -0.223 (0.052)  -0.147 (0.041) 
       
%DQNORDQ 1HLWKHU . -0.263 (0.028)  -0.241 (0.022)  -0.285 (0.020) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ . -0.074 (0.034)  -0.104 (0.022)  -0.099 (0.023) 
 QRUEDQN . -0.055 (0.037)  -0.006 (0.026)  0.006 (0.032) 
 ORDQ . 0.031 (0.040)  0.092 (0.029)  0.097 (0.030) 
 . 0.134 (0.039)  0.139 (0.026)  0.152 (0.026) 
 . 0.227 (0.042)  0.120 (0.019)  0.129 (0.025) 
      
 %RWK . 0.025 (0.024)  0.035 (0.024)  0.025 (0.030) 
 . 0.036 (0.033)  0.045 (0.041)  0.064 (0.055) 
 . -0.053 (0.038)  -0.011 (0.048)  -0.013 (0.050) 
 . -0.053 (0.042)  -0.035 (0.047)  -0.077 (0.047) 
 . -0.061 (0.042)  -0.073 (0.049)  -0.087 (0.043) 
 . 0.106 (0.044)  0.040 (0.054)  0.087 (0.055) 
      
%RWK 1HLWKHU . -0.289 (0.019)  -0.186 (0.042)  -0.256 (0.040) 
 VXEVLG\ . -0.110 (0.018)  -0.035 (0.044)  -0.008 (0.055) 
 QRUEDQN . -0.002 (0.022)  -0.097 (0.040)  -0.101 (0.044) 
 ORDQ . 0.084 (0.022)  -0.039 (0.049)  0.027 (0.055) 
 . 0.195 (0.020)  0.123 (0.045)  0.165 (0.062) 
 . 0.121 (0.016)  0.233 (0.054)  0.173 (0.048) 
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k T = ￿ s T =  y  () () () () s T s y E k T k y E = - =   () () () k T s y k y E = -   () () () s T s y k y E = -  
6XEVLG\ 1HLWKHU . -0.136 (0.016)  -0.149 (0.021)  -0.127 (0.019) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ . 0.010 (0.015)  0.002 (0.022)  -0.001 (0.019) 
 QRUEDQN . 0.078 (0.016)  0.068 (0.019)  0.076 (0.020) 
 ORDQ . 0.029 (0.016)  0.042 (0.018)  0.013 (0.019) 
 . 0.026 (0.011)  0.035 (0.013)  0.043 (0.013) 
 . -0.006 (0.008)  0.003 (0.007)  -0.004 (0.009) 
       
 /RDQRQO\ . 0.117 (0.010)  0.087 (0.008)  0.083 (0.011) 
 . 0.074 (0.023)  0.125 (0.014)  0.118 (0.014) 
 . 0.130 (0.024)  0.108 (0.014)  0.116 (0.016) 
 . -0.078 (0.030)  -0.067 (0.016)  -0.080 (0.017) 
 . -0.111 (0.027)  -0.142 (0.015)  -0.134 (0.016) 
 . -0.132 (0.024)  -0.111 (0.009)  -0.104 (0.012) 
      
 %RWK . 0.089 (0.009)  0.107 (0.011)  0.104 (0.015) 
 . 0.121 (0.011)  0.077 (0.025)  0.070 (0.029) 
 . 0.115 (0.014)  0.113 (0.029)  0.127 (0.029) 
 . -0.049 (0.016)  -0.092 (0.031)  -0.076 (0.040) 
 . -0.157 (0.014)  -0.100 (0.032)  -0.123 (0.034) 
 . -0.118 (0.011)  -0.105 (0.027)  -0.101 (0.028) 
      
%DQNORDQ 1HLWKHU . -0.253 (0.016)  -0.224 (0.020)  -0.217 (0.020) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ . -0.064 (0.025)  -0.125 (0.020)  -0.114 (0.018) 
 QRUEDQN . -0.053 (0.025)  -0.030 (0.020)  -0.044 (0.020) 
 ORDQ . 0.107 (0.032)  0.081 (0.026)  0.098 (0.026) 
 . 0.137 (0.028)  0.188 (0.017)  0.160 (0.021) 
 . 0.126 (0.024)  0.110 (0.013)  0.117 (0.019) 
      
 %RWK . -0.028 (0.009)  0.029 (0.011)  0.018 (0.013) 
 . 0.047 (0.022)  -0.050 (0.027)  -0.054 (0.027) 
 . -0.016 (0.024)  0.001 (0.027)  0.031 (0.026) 
 . 0.029 (0.032)  -0.062 (0.035)  -0.037 (0.038) 
 . -0.046 (0.029)  0.059 (0.031)  0.037 (0.035) 
 . 0.014 (0.025)  0.025 (0.031)  0.005 (0.027) 
      
%RWK 1HLWKHU . -0.225 (0.015)  -0.216 (0.017)  -0.255 (0.016) 
 VXEVLG\ . -0.111 (0.015)  -0.042 (0.028)  -0.061 (0.031) 
 QRUEDQN . -0.037 (0.016)  -0.044 (0.033)  -0.043 (0.030) 
 ORDQ . 0.078 (0.018)  0.070 (0.037)  0.111 (0.043) 
 . 0.183 (0.016)  0.131 (0.029)  0.145 (0.032) 
 . 0.112 (0.012)  0.101 (0.025)  0.103 (0.030) 
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k T = ￿ s T =  y  () () () () s T s y E k T k y E = - =   () () () k T s y k y E = -   () () () s T s y k y E = -  
6XEVLG\ 1HLWKHU . -0.175 (0.020)  -0.166 (0.019)  -0.166 (0.026) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ . 0.017 (0.023)  -0.018 (0.023)  0.016 (0.030) 
 QRUEDQN . 0.029 (0.024)  0.017 (0.025)  -0.005 (0.030) 
 ORDQ . 0.114 (0.028)  0.128 (0.031)  0.130 (0.032) 
 . 0.025 (0.020)  0.037 (0.023)  0.029 (0.024) 
 . -0.009 (0.014)  0.002 (0.015)  -0.004 (0.020) 
      
 /RDQRQO\ . 0.058 (0.020)  0.086 (0.027)  0.084 (0.024) 
 . 0.108 (0.023)  0.068 (0.037)  0.050 (0.038) 
 . 0.095 (0.025)  0.130 (0.035)  0.119 (0.034) 
 . 0.067 (0.029)  0.100 (0.044)  0.103 (0.048) 
 . -0.097 (0.022)  -0.094 (0.042)  -0.091 (0.038) 
 . -0.231 (0.018)  -0.289 (0.044)  -0.266 (0.045) 
      
 %RWK . 0.091 (0.021)  0.069 (0.027)  0.054 (0.022) 
 . 0.102 (0.027)  0.099 (0.027)  0.095 (0.026) 
 . 0.113 (0.030)  0.102 (0.029)  0.076 (0.026) 
 . 0.150 (0.037)  0.034 (0.033)  0.032 (0.039) 
 . -0.115 (0.034)  -0.083 (0.028)  -0.087 (0.028) 
 . -0.341 (0.035)  -0.220 (0.016)  -0.170 (0.022) 
      
%DQNORDQ 1HLWKHU . -0.234 (0.010)  -0.188 (0.017)  -0.254 (0.019) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ . -0.091 (0.009)  -0.087 (0.022)  -0.021 (0.037) 
 QRUEDQN . -0.066 (0.010)  -0.096 (0.021)  -0.084 (0.034) 
 ORDQ . 0.046 (0.013)  -0.038 (0.032)  0.003 (0.037) 
 . 0.122 (0.012)  0.124 (0.034)  0.115 (0.036) 
 . 0.222 (0.012)  0.286 (0.034)  0.241 (0.043) 
      
 %RWK . 0.033 (0.012)  -0.032 (0.018)  -0.032 (0.015) 
 . -0.006 (0.018)  0.030 (0.025)  0.017 (0.018) 
 . 0.019 (0.021)  -0.030 (0.026)  -0.033 (0.024) 
 . 0.082 (0.027)  -0.038 (0.039)  -0.074 (0.036) 
 . -0.019 (0.030)  0.034 (0.037)  0.033 (0.035) 
 . -0.110 (0.034)  0.036 (0.038)  0.089 (0.036) 
      
%RWK 1HLWKHU . -0.267 (0.013)  -0.221 (0.010)  -0.232 (0.010) 
 VXEVLG\ . -0.085 (0.018)  -0.096 (0.009)  -0.082 (0.010) 
 QRUEDQN . -0.085 (0.019)  -0.061 (0.011)  -0.070 (0.012) 
 ORDQ . -0.036 (0.025)  0.033 (0.015)  0.033 (0.016) 
 . 0.140 (0.029)  0.123 (0.013)  0.125 (0.015) 
 . 0.332 (0.032)  0.222 (0.015)  0.227 (0.015) 
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on the longevity of the new firms 
 
 
Table A.10: firm survival for the long-term unemployed
6NSUREDELOLW\WREHVWLOORSHUDWLQJDWWKHHQGRIWKHNWKVHPHVWHUDIWHUWKHFUHDWLRQ
  'LIIHUHQFHRIPHDQV &DXVDOHIIHFWNHUQHO
k T = ￿ s T =  \ () () () () s T s y E k T k y E = - =   () () () k T s y k y E = -   () () () s T s y k y E = -  
6XEVLG\ 1HLWKHU 6 0.011 (0.009)  0.018 (0.011)  0.009 (0.013) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ 6 0.015 (0.016)  0.030 (0.019)  0.016 (0.021) 
 QRUEDQN 6 0.005 (0.019)  0.037 (0.025)  0.004 (0.024) 
 ORDQ 6 0.018 (0.021)  0.055 (0.027)  0.012 (0.027) 
 6 0.014 (0.022)  0.057 (0.027)  0.015 (0.028) 
 6 0.019 (0.022)  0.072 (0.028)  0.025 (0.030) 
      
 /RDQRQO\ 6 -0.010 (0.016)  -0.010 (0.021)  -0.012 (0.016) 
 6 -0.052 (0.027)  -0.039 (0.038)  -0.053 (0.033) 
 6 -0.103 (0.034)  -0.062 (0.051)  -0.108 (0.041) 
 6 -0.134 (0.037)  -0.084 (0.060)  -0.139 (0.049) 
 6 -0.148 (0.040)  -0.080 (0.063)  -0.136 (0.053) 
 6 -0.108 (0.043)  -0.069 (0.064)  -0.107 (0.054) 
      
 %RWK 6 -0.001 (0.009)  -0.002 (0.011)  -0.010 (0.009) 
 6 -0.031 (0.015)  -0.034 (0.016)  -0.043 (0.018) 
 6 -0.067 (0.019)  -0.069 (0.020)  -0.073 (0.022) 
 6 -0.089 (0.021)  -0.095 (0.023)   -0.094 (0.023) 
 6 -0.076 (0.023)  -0.066 (0.025)  -0.073 (0.026) 
 6 -0.083 (0.023)  -0.068 (0.025)  -0.080 (0.026) 
       
%DQNORDQ 1HLWKHU 6 0.021 (0.017)  0.022 (0.024)  0.007 (0.034) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ 6 0.067 (0.028)  0.055 (0.042)  0.040 (0.053) 
 QRUEDQN 6 0.108 (0.035)  0.106 (0.049)  0.082 (0.061) 
 ORDQ 6 0.152 (0.039)  0.112 (0.055)  0.119 (0.071) 
 6 0.162 (0.041)  0.099 (0.056)  0.096 (0.072) 
 6 0.127 (0.045)  0.078 (0.063)  0.046 (0.079) 
      
 %RWK 6 0.009 (0.017)  0.010 (0.017)  0.027 (0.010) 
 6 0.021 (0.028)  0.012 (0.035)  0.006 (0.046) 
 6 0.037 (0.035)  0.023 (0.044)  -0.014 (0.056) 
 6 0.046 (0.039)  0.051 (0.050)  -0.011 (0.060) 
 6 0.072 (0.042)  0.089 (0.051)  0.010 (0.062) 
 6 0.026 (0.046)  0.066 (0.057)  -0.007 (0.062) 
      
%RWK 1HLWKHU 6 0.011 (0.011)  0.004 (0.014)  0.005 (0.015) 
 VXEVLG\ 6 0.046 (0.018)  0.035 (0.024)  0.035 (0.024) 
 QRUEDQN 6 0.072 (0.022)  0.061 (0.031)  0.071 (0.028) 
 ORDQ 6 0.107 (0.024)  0.101 (0.033)  0.111 (0.029) 
 6 0.090 (0.025)  0.102 (0.033)  0.105 (0.030) 
 6 0.102 (0.026)  0.127 (0.034)  0.114 (0.033) 
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k T = ￿ s T =  \ () () () () s T s y E k T k y E = - =   () () () k T s y k y E = -   () () () s T s y k y E = -  
6XEVLG\ 1HLWKHU 6 -0.001 (0.006)  0.001 (0.008)  -0.001 (0.008) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ 6 0.036 (0.013)  0.049 (0.016)  0.040 (0.017) 
 QRUEDQN 6 0.041 (0.016)  0.058 (0.023)  0.051 (0.018) 
 ORDQ 6 0.047 (0.017)  0.075 (0.021)  0.054 (0.020) 
 6 0.050 (0.018)  0.072 (0.022)  0.043 (0.022) 
 6 0.047 (0.018)  0.066 (0.022)  0.040 (0.023) 
       
 /RDQRQO\ 6 -0.009 (0.009)  -0.014 (0.008)  -0.008 (0.010) 
 6 -0.023 (0.017)  -0.032 (0.022)  -0.029 (0.020) 
 6 -0.016 (0.024)  -0.006 (0.035)  -0.027 (0.026) 
 6 -0.019 (0.027)  0.005 (0.038)  -0.028 (0.031) 
 6 -0.034 (0.028)  -0.002 (0.038)  -0.033 (0.034) 
 6 -0.051 (0.028)  -0.018 (0.038)  -0.051 (0.034) 
      
 %RWK 6 -0.007 (0.005)  -0.003 (0.006)  -0.005 (0.006) 
 6 -0.026 (0.009)  -0.012 (0.012)  -0.025 (0.010) 
 6 -0.050 (0.012)  -0.029 (0.012)  -0.042 (0.013) 
 6 -0.072 (0.014)  -0.048 (0.014)  -0.058 (0.013) 
 6 -0.083 (0.014)  -0.053 (0.016)  -0.066 (0.015) 
 6 -0.091 (0.015)  -0.065 (0.016)  -0.073 (0.015) 
      
%DQNORDQ 1HLWKHU 6 0.009 (0.010)  -0.001 (0.012)  0.007 (0.012) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ 6 0.059 (0.020)  0.046 (0.022)  0.050 (0.027) 
 QRUEDQN 6 0.057 (0.026)  0.044 (0.033)  0.013 (0.036) 
 ORDQ 6 0.066 (0.029)  0.043 (0.036)  0.016 (0.040) 
 6 0.083 (0.031)  0.060 (0.040)  0.031 (0.042) 
 6 0.098 (0.031)  0.080 (0.042)  0.050 (0.042) 
      
 %RWK 6 0.003 (0.009)  0.002 (0.012)  0.008 (0.008) 
 6 -0.003 (0.018)  0.016 (0.022)  0.015 (0.021) 
 6 -0.035 (0.024)  0.008 (0.029)  -0.009 (0.027) 
 6 -0.053 (0.027)  -0.016 (0.031)  -0.041 (0.037) 
 6 -0.049 (0.029)  -0.018 (0.034)  -0.046 (0.037) 
 6 -0.040 (0.029)  -0.007 (0.036)  -0.044 (0.039) 
      
%RWK 1HLWKHU 6 0.007 (0.007)  0.012 (0.011)  0.004 (0.008) 
 VXEVLG\ 6 0.062 (0.013)  0.072 (0.022)  0.054 (0.018) 
 QRUEDQN 6 0.091 (0.016)  0.108 (0.024)  0.078 (0.024) 
 ORDQ 6 0.119 (0.018)  0.132 (0.026)  0.107 (0.023) 
 6 0.132 (0.019)  0.142 (0.026)  0.110 (0.024) 
 6 0.138 (0.019)  0.146 (0.026)  0.117 (0.025) 
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k T = ￿ s T =  < () () () () s T s y E k T k y E = - =   () () () k T s y k y E = -   () () () s T s y k y E = -  
6XEVLG\ 1HLWKHU 6 0.001 (0.010)  -0.008 (0.013)  0.004 (0.011) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ 6 0.002 (0.017)  -0.002 (0.020)  0.011 (0.019) 
 QRUEDQN 6 -0.023 (0.022)  -0.025 (0.024)  -0.031 (0.026) 
 ORDQ 6 -0.008 (0.024)  -0.005 (0.027)  -0.041 (0.028) 
 6 0.005 (0.025)  0.011 (0.026)  -0.023 (0.029) 
 6 -0.009 (0.026)  -0.001 (0.028)  -0.028 (0.030) 
      
 /RDQRQO\ 6 -0.014 (0.010)  -0.019 (0.011)  -0.011 (0.013) 
 6 -0.039 (0.017)  -0.037 (0.017)  -0.036 (0.021) 
 6 -0.084 (0.022)  -0.076 (0.025)  -0.088 (0.029) 
 6 -0.083 (0.024)  -0.075 (0.026)  -0.107 (0.032) 
 6 -0.082 (0.025)  -0.073 (0.026)  -0.103 (0.033) 
 6 -0.096 (0.027)  -0.089 (0.027)  -0.115 (0.034) 
      
 %RWK 6 -0.004 (0.014)  -0.013 (0.014)  -0.005 (0.012) 
 6 -0.027 (0.023)  -0.044 (0.024)  -0.042 (0.025) 
 6 -0.070 (0.028)  -0.066 (0.029)  -0.089 (0.037) 
 6 -0.081 (0.031)  -0.078 (0.031)  -0.108 (0.043) 
 6 -0.067 (0.034)  -0.081 (0.032)  -0.095 (0.048) 
 6 -0.075 (0.035)  -0.104 (0.033)  -0.116 (0.048) 
      
%DQNORDQ 1HLWKHU 6 0.015 (0.004)  0.014 (0.004)  0.016 (0.005) 
RQO\ VXEVLG\ 6 0.042 (0.007)  0.043 (0.009)  0.040 (0.009) 
 QRUEDQN 6 0.061 (0.009)  0.061 (0.010)  0.056 (0.010) 
 ORDQ 6 0.074 (0.010)  0.076 (0.011)  0.069 (0.012) 
 6 0.087 (0.011)  0.087 (0.011)  0.077 (0.013) 
 6 0.087 (0.011)  0.089 (0.012)  0.079 (0.013) 
      
 %RWK 6 -0.010 (0.011)  0.001 (0.011)  0.007 (0.011) 
 6 -0.013 (0.017)  -0.002 (0.019)  0.001 (0.015) 
 6 -0.013 (0.020)  0.003 (0.025)  -0.002 (0.021) 
 6 -0.002 (0.023)  -0.007 (0.028)  -0.018 (0.024) 
 6 -0.016 (0.025)  -0.003 (0.031)  -0.009 (0.027) 
 6 -0.021 (0.027)  -0.004 (0.031)  -0.002 (0.028) 
      
%RWK 1HLWKHU 6 0.005 (0.011)  -0.001 (0.014)  0.007 (0.019) 
 VXEVLG\ 6 0.029 (0.016)  0.037 (0.018)  0.045 (0.024) 
 QRUEDQN 6 0.047 (0.020)  0.047 (0.022)  0.052 (0.031) 
 ORDQ 6 0.073 (0.022)  0.069 (0.025)  0.081 (0.032) 
 6 0.071 (0.024)  0.082 (0.028)  0.095 (0.032) 
 6 0.066 (0.026)  0.080 (0.029)  0.101 (0.032) 
      
 
